https://www.pvmboost.com/
198.185.159.145 · Squarespace, Inc.
New York, United States
241 days
200 · 25.1s
Valid· R12, Let's Encrypt, US
COMPLETED
Registered-domain escalation
Submit pvmboost.com as the primary IOC, enriched with evidence from hostile subdomains like www.pvmboost.com.
No KB/IOK detections were recorded for this scan.
gaming | technology | ecommerce | finance | social_media | other · 6/3/2026
The page presents branding for "Pvmboost The #1 Remote Boosting service for OSRS" and visually imitates a branded OSRS boosting service. However, the domain www.pvmboost.com is not an official OSRS brand site; the page uses Squarespace hosting and includes multiple analytics/ad scripts. The screenshot along with the page title and content indicates a remote boosting service rather than a conventional credential phishing flow, but the visual impersonation of OSRS-themed UI raises impersonation concerns. No explicit credential harvesting form or login capture is observed in static HTML, but POST endpoints and extensive third-party tracking suggest data-exfiltration risk via analytics, while the form present does not collect credentials. Given the evidence, this appears to be a potentially abusive first-party service rather than a classic credential-phishing site on an impersonated brand, though impersonation signals are present.
Capture
Stages: 3
Canonical: Late Render (+3s)
Changed: No
Credential Signals
Forms: 1
Password fields: 0
Late-stage login UI: No
Resource Signals
Resources: 126
Hosts: 16
Domains: 13
Suspicious Endpoints
hxxps://www[.]pvmboost[.]com/api/census/RecordHit
hxxps://www[.]pvmboost[.]com/api/census/button-render
hxxps://www[.]pvmboost[.]com/
The site presents OSRS-boosting branding on a domain not clearly affiliated with the official OSRS or recognized trusted service, with multiple external data-collection endpoints and a live chat widget, indicating data exfiltration risk and potential abuse. The visual impersonation signals and the presence of census/analytics endpoints justify elevated concern. While there is no explicit credential harvesting form detected in the static HTML, the combination of impersonation cues, dynamic content, and extensive third-party scripts warrants monitoring and potential action if further evidence confirms credential harvesting or illicit service activity. Recommend monitoring and preparing abuse reports if additional indicators of credential theft or scam behavior emerge; consider domain-level actions if impersonation patterns persist.
Monitor