https://akram.in.net
172.67.173.109 · Cloudflare, Inc.
Toronto, Canada
11525 days
200 · 17.1s
Valid· WE1, Google Trust Services, US
COMPLETED
Domain Intelligence: in.net
Scanned 2 times since May 16, 2026, 02:35 PM UTC
Linked Phishing Report
This scan is attached to a vendor submission report
Brand
igetused.to
Vendors
30/31
Status
partial
Registered-domain escalation
Submit in.net as the primary IOC, enriched with evidence from hostile subdomains like akram.in.net.
No KB/IOK detections were recorded for this scan.
technology | ecommerce | finance | other · 6/3/2026
The final URL redirects to igetused.to from an initial domain akram.in.net. The page HTML is empty (no forms, no scripts), and the screenshot implies potential branding impersonation, but there is insufficient concrete evidence in the static content to confirm a credential-phishing flow. SSL cert is valid and shows a Google Trust Services issuer for the domain, but the final URL is distinct from the initial sender. The observed network activity includes a redirect chain and an API call to ipify.org, with no login forms detected in the static HTML. Visual impersonation indicators cannot be conclusively determined from the provided HTML alone; the screenshot may imply branding replication, which warrants cautious attention, but the current data does not prove credential harvesting on the scanned page itself.
Capture
Stages: 1
Canonical: Settled Render
Changed: No
Credential Signals
Forms: 0
Password fields: 0
Late-stage login UI: No
Resource Signals
Resources: 3
Hosts: 3
Domains: 3
No specific IOCs identified in source
The scan data indicates a domain redirect chain and potential visual impersonation signals in the screenshot, but there is no concrete evidence of credential collection or phishing form submission on the final page as served. The HTML is empty of forms and the static analysis shows only 3 resources loaded with a redirect to a different brand domain, suggesting possible branding or hosting for a redirect/landing page rather than direct credential harvesting. Given the presence of a redirect chain and the final site being a distinct brand, this warrants monitoring and further verification rather than immediate takedown, unless additional signals (e.g., phishing UI or credential capture) are discovered. Recommend monitoring and further verification with additional dynamic analysis to confirm the intent.
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